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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : CaseNo.200700403-CA 
RICHARD WILLIS JONES, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is venue a procedural prerequisite that a defendant must place in issue for a 
court ruling before trial, or is it a part of the case that the prosecutor must prove to the 
jury at trial? 
Standard of Review. Statutory law governs venue, and statutory interpretation is 
a question of law. See State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1977) ("the legislature 
has been given the power to pass laws regarding the waiver of, or the application of, the 
privilege of venue"); State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, If 8, 589 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (the 
appellate courts "review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusions") (citation omitted). 
2. In any case, did the trial court abuse its discretion when, following the 
defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case, the court allowed the State 
to reopen to put on evidence that the Saddler Drive residence, where the crime was 
committed, was located in Salt Lake County? 
Standard of Review. A trial court abuses its discretion "only if the trial court's 
decision [is] beyond the limits of reasonability," or, in other words, only "if the trial 
court's actions are inherently unfair or if. . . no reasonable person would take the view 
adopted by the trial court." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^  101, 63 P.3d 731 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statues are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i). R2. A jury found defendant guilty as charged. R95. The trial court imposed 
an indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years, but suspended the sentence and 
placed defendant on probation. R98. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
"I have drugs in my pocket" 
On October 6, 20055 Officer Kenneth Eatchel, a warrants detective, went to 8564 
Saddler Drive in West Jordan to arrest defendant on an outstanding warrant. R129:13-15. 
Defendant was cooperative. R129:15. Officer Eatchel's normal procedure was to 
handcuff an arrestee and then search him for weapons and/or contraband. R129:16. 
After Officer Eatchel handcuffed defendant, he asked defendant whether he had 
"anything that I need to be concerned with . . . sharp objects—needles, anything that 
would poke me or stick me." Id. Defendant responded, "I have drugs in my pocket." Id. 
Defendant specified that he had methamphetamine in the right cargo pocket of his pants. 
R129:17. 
Officer Eatchel removed a plastic pill bottle from that pocket. R129:18. Inside 
the bottle was a plastic bag, and inside the bag was a white crystalline powder. Rl 29:46. 
Tests conducted at the State Crime laboratory identified the substance as 
methamphetamine. R129:48. 
"I would be willing because it sounds like an oversight 
to permit the State to reopen" 
During the State's case in chief, Officer Kenneth Eatchel testified that he was a 
West Jordan police officer. R129:12-13. He further testified that he arrested defendant 
on an outstanding warrant at 8564 Saddler Drive. R129:14-15. After the State presented 
its testimony and rested, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the 
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State had produced no evidence that the crime occurred in Salt Lake County. R129:67-
68. 
The State agreed that the officer had testified to the address on Saddler Drive, but 
had not testified that the address was located within Salt Lake County. Rl29:69. The 
State therefore asked the trial court to take judicial notice that the address was in Salt 
Lake County. R129:69. 
The trial court responded, "I don't think I would have any trouble taking judicial 
notice that West Jordan City is in Salt Lake Count[y], but I'm not enough personally 
familiar with this address to say that I could take judicial notice that it's in West Jordan 
City which is in Salt Lake County." Id. The Court stated, however, "I don't remember 
whether the officer talked about this being in West Jordan City or not, b u t . . . I would be 
willing because it sounds like an oversight to permit the State to reopen to call the officer 
for that one purpose . . . and allow him to testify." R129:71. 
Defense counsel objected, arguing that "the State has rested" and that the location 
in Salt Lake County "was an essential element that they needed to prove and they 
haven't." Rl 29:71-72. The trial court, however, concluded that the lack of testimony on 
the matter "sounds like an oversight." R129:72. The court stated: "I don't see any real 
prejudice, and I'll permit the State to do it if that's what they want to do." Id. 
Officer Eatchel then took the stand and testified that he arrested defendant "at 
8564 South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah in the County of Salt Lake." 
R129:73-74. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State 
to reopen its case to present additional testimony of venue. He claims that, absent the 
additional testimony, the evidence did not suffice to support his conviction. 
Defendant's claim fails first because in Utah venue is a procedural prerequisite. A 
defendant must make any objection to venue before trial or objections are waived. If 
placed in issue, the trial court must determine proper venue by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Venue is not part of the case that the State must prove to the jury. 
Here, defendant made no pretrial objection to venue. Thus he waived his right to 
object. Further, because venue need not be proved to the jury, permitting the State to 
reopen to present additional evidence of venue was harmless. 
In any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to 
reopen its case before defendant had presented any evidence. The State's failure to 
present evidence that Saddler Drive was in West Jordan City and that West Jordan City 
was in Salt Lake County was inadvertent. The trial court's decision to allow the State to 
reopen did not prejudice defendant's ability to present his defense. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that "this court should reverse because the trial court abused its 
discretion when, following [defendant's] motion for a directed verdict, it allowed the 
State to reopen its case in order to put on additional evidence regarding venue." 
Appellant's Br. at 6 (capitalization, boldface, and underlining omitted). Defendant 
claims that "[t]he trial court based its decision on its finding that the State's failure to 
present evidence of venue was an oversight" and argues that "the finding was clearly 
erroneous." Id. at 8, 10. He contends that "because the State made a conscious decision 
to rely on circumstantial evidence of venue, rather than presenting direct evidence, it was 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the State to reopen its case to present 
direct evidence of venue when its gamble failed." Id. at 10. 
Defendant's claim fails for two reasons. First, under Utah law, venue is a 
procedural prerequisite to prosecution, not an element of the offense to be proved at trial, 
and must be raised by objection before trial begins. Defendant did not object before trial 
and therefore waived any objection to venue. Thus, venue was not in issue, and 
permitting the State to reopen to present evidence of venue was, at most, harmless. 
Second, assuming arguendo that venue was a matter for the jury and that it had been 
placed at issue, the trial court acted properly in permitting the State to reopen and present 
evidence of venue. 
o 
I. 
IN UTAH, VENUE IS A PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITE THAT A 
DEFENDANT MUST PLACE IN ISSUE FOR A COURT RULING 
BEFORE TRIAL; IT IS NOT PART OF THE CASE THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR MUST PROVE TO THE JURY AT TRIAL 
In some jurisdictions, venue must be proved at trial. In those jurisdictions, "venue 
is not simply a prerequisite that the defendant may choose to challenge pretrial; it is 
viewed as part of the case that the prosecution must prove at trial." See Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 16.1(g) (2d ed. 1999). 
But in other jurisdictions, including Utah, venue is a procedural prerequisite, 
"treat[ed] in much the same manner as other procedural prerequisites for prosecution." 
Id. at § 16.1(g) & n.230 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) and State v. Cauble, 563 
P.2d 775 (Utah 1977)). "In those jurisdictions, the defendant must put the venue 
prerequisite in issue by a pretrial motion to dismiss [or by a pretrial objection to venue], 
with the court then making a determination that venue does or does not exist." Id. at 
§ 16.1(g). 
Both statutory and case law establish that Utah treats venue as a procedural 
prerequisite. Relevant statutory law is found in the venue statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-202 (West 2004), and in the statute that defines "presumption of innocence" and 
"element of the offense," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (West 2004). 
The venue statute contains two subsections. The first subsection explains how to 
"determine[e] the proper place of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(1). The second 
explains how and when allegedly improper venue can be placed in issue. It provides that 
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"[a]ll objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before 
trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2). 
The statute defining "[pjresumption of innocence" and "[ejlement of the offense" 
contains three subsections. The first subsection states that a defendant "is presumed 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1). The second defines "element of the 
offense" to include only two matters: (1) "[t]he conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense," 
and (2) "[t]he culpable mental state required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2). The third 
specifically provides that "[t]he existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of 
the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3). It also states that jurisdiction and venue 
"shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. 
Read together, these statutes explain that venue is not an element of the offense. It 
is a matter that must be placed in issue before trial, not at trial. And, when placed in 
issue, it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. While the statutes do not expressly state that the court, not the jury, 
shall make the determination of venue, their logic requires that result. 
First, to find venue is to find "the proper place of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
202(1). As explained, any objection to venue must be made before trial. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-202(2). Also, as explained, a defendant waives venue if he does not object 
before trial. See id. Thus, venue is placed in issue by an objection before trial, at a time 
when the trial court can ensure that the trial is held in the proper place. See State v. 
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Miller, 2003 UT App 76U (stating "we believe that the burden to prove venue vests only 
if venue is challenged before trial"). It would be illogical to hold trial and then, after 
completing the trial, decide whether the trial had or had not been held in the proper place, 
particularly where the question must be placed in issue before trial is held. 
Second, the standard of proof for establishing venue is "by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Courts, not juries, usually make determinations based on this standard. In 
fact, to make venue a jury issue would require instructing a jury that it must find the 
elements of the offense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it must find venue 
only by a preponderance of the evidence. 
In addition to the relevant statutory law, Utah case law establishes that venue is a 
procedural prerequisite. In Cauble, the defendant appealed his theft conviction, claiming 
that venue had been improper and that the state had failed to prove all of the elements of 
his offense. 563 P.2d at 776. He also argued that the venue statute was unconstitutional. 
Id. at 777. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Cauble's contentions. The court first held that 
the venue statute was constitutional. The court noted that "the right to be tried in the 
county in which the crime occurred, is a personal privilege which can be waived by 
failing to make a proper objection." Id. Under the venue statute, such objections had to 
be made before trial. Id. Cauble's "first objection to the place of trial was not made until 
after the prosecution had rested its case." Id. The court therefore concluded that Cauble 
could not "be heard to raise the objection on appeal because the statute clearly state[d] it 
must be made before trial." Id. In other words, Cauble had waived any claim regarding 
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venue. See id; see also State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1988) (rejecting 
Lovell's claim that jury instructions "were improper because they did not specify that at 
least one element of each crime charged must have occurred in Davis County," and 
holding that because Lovell made no objection to venue before trial, he "waived any 
objection thereto"). 
The court also held that Cauble's claim "that all the elements of the offense were 
not proved [wa]s entirely without merit." Cauble, 563 P.2d at 779. The court stated that 
the only elements needed to prove theft were "(1) the intent to deprive another of his 
property, and (2) the obtaining unauthorized control over the property." Id. The court 
then observed, "Furthermore, it should be pointed out that venue is not an element of the 
offense and need be proved merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. 
Thus, case law, like statutory law, establishes that venue must be placed in issue 
by an objection before trial and that, when placed in issue, it must be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. While case law does not expressly hold that venue is an 
issue for the court, not the jury, the logical considerations outlined above demonstrate 
that it is. 
This reading of Utah law reflects sound policy. As explained by the California 
Supreme Court, the opposite reading, a "rule that venue is a question of fact for the jury 
is unsound for a number of fundamental reasons." People v. Posey, 82 P.3d 755, 759 
(Cal. 2004). First, making venue a question for the jury "impedes the purposes 
underlying the venue provisions, especially their principal purpose . . . from a defendant's 
perspective of protecting] a defendant from being required to stand trial in a distant and 
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unduly burdensome locale." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It 
"put[s] off any finding of venue until after the defendant [has been] required to undergo 
the rigors and hardship of standing trial in an assertedly improper place.'5 Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). It also burdens the prosecution by putting off the 
finding of venue until "after the state [has] incurred the time and expense of conducting a 
trial there." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, having a jury 
decide venue "is inconsistent with contemporary treatment of other analogous . . . issues, 
inasmuch as venue is a procedural question involving the appropriateness of a place for a 
defendant's trial. . . and not a substantive question relating to the defendant's guilt or 
innocence." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Third, such a rule 
"threatens the untoward consequence of an unwarranted acquittal when the jury returns a 
verdict of not guilty predicated solely on lack of proper venue." Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
For all of these reasons, the California court determined that "venue is a question 
of law for the court, to be decided prior to trial," not "a question of fact to be decided by 
the jury at the conclusion of trial." Id. at 758, 760. 
The policy considerations set forth by that court, together with the language of 
Utah statutes and cases addressing venue, demonstrate that here, as in California, venue is 
a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. It is a procedural 
prerequisite. Any challenge to the existence of proper venue must be raised by objection 
before trial; otherwise, any challenge to venue is waived. If placed in issue, the 
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prosecution must present evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
venue is proper, and the court must decide the issue before trial begins. 
Defendant's authority is not to the contrary. Defendant relies on State v. Mitchell, 
278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955); State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339 (Utah 1955); and Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-501. 
Mitchell and Bailey do not decide whether the court or the jury should determine 
venue. They merely reject a rule that "where venue is in issue, it must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt," and hold that "it must be done by a preponderance of the evidence 
only." Mitchell, 278 P.2d at 620; see also Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340 (quoting Mitchell).1 
Section 501 merely states that jurisdiction and venue "shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Defendant asserts that this means that "they 
must . . . be proved at trial." Appellant's Br. at 7. It does not. It means that they must be 
established by that standard, not that they must be proved to the jury at trial. In State v. 
Payne, 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court expressly addressed the 
statute and held that jurisdiction, the first of the two matters that must be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence, is a question for the court, not the jury. See id. at 1033. 
No party in either case raised a question about if or when venue must be 
established or whether venue can be waived. Mitchell and Bailey argued that venue had 
not been established; and in each defendant's case, the court simply held that it had. See 
Mitchell, 278 P.2d at 620; Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340. 
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Thus, the court necessarily held that the statute does not require that jurisdiction and 
venue be proved at trial. 
Moreover, to read this statute to require that venue be proved to the jury at trial is, 
as explained above, illogical. It would mean that the proper place for trial could not be 
established until after trial was held, potentially requiring the defendant "to stand trial in 
a distant and unduly burdensome locale," "putting off any finding of venue until after the 
defendant [has been] required to undergo the rigors and hardship of standing trial in an 
assertedly improper place," wasting the time and resources of both parties, and resulting 
in "the untoward consequence of an unwarranted acquittal when the jury returns a verdict 
of not guilty predicated solely on lack of proper venue." Posey, 82 P.3d at 759 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Defendant has raised no claim that jurisdiction was improper. Questions of 
venue are not questions of jurisdiction. Venue "does not involve a question of 
fundamental or subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding." People v. Simon, 25 P.3d 
598, 608 (Cal. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the crime is one over which 
California can and does exercise its legislative jurisdiction because it was committed in 
whole or in part within the state's borders, California courts have jurisdiction to try the 
defendant." Id. If a "charge is brought in a competent court. . . , that court, no matter 
where located in the state, may have subject matter jurisdiction of the offense." Id. For 
this reason, "venue is not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense; and, both in civil and 
criminal cases, a change of venue from the superior court of one county to the same court 
in another county does not affect its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case." Id. 
"If only the court or courts designated by the relevant venue statute possessed subject 
matter jurisdiction over the proceeding, no change of venue from the locality could be 
valid, for subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court. . . ." Id. Thus, 
"criminal venue statutes do not involve a court's jurisdiction in the fundamental sense of 
subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 609. 
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In sum, defendant cannot show that venue was an element of the offense, that it 
was ever in issue, or even that—had it been timely placed in issue—it was a question for 
the jury. Thus, defendant cannot show that permitting the State to reopen to present 
additional evidence of venue affected his case in any way. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO REOPEN ITS CASE TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT VENUE WAS PROPER 
Alternatively, assuming for purposes of argument that the State was required to 
establish venue at trial, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to allow the State 
to reopen its case in chief to present additional evidence that venue in Salt Lake County 
was proper. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the 
State to reopen its case to present evidence of venue. More specifically, he claims that 
(1) the prosecutor "made a conscious decision" not to "present direct evidence of venue," 
and (2) "absent the additional testimony presented after the trial court improperly allowed 
the State to reopen its case, there was insufficient evidence to establish venue by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Appellant's Br. at 10-11. 
Defendant cannot show that the trial court acted improperly when it permitted the 
State to reopen. Utah courts have long recognized that a trial court may permit the State 
to reopen its case to meet an insufficiency challenge. See State v. Gregorious, 16 P.2d 
893, 894-95 (Utah 1932) (holding that "[i]t was within the discretion of the court to 
permit the case to be reopened" where the State asked permission to reopen its case after 
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the State had rested and the defendant had moved for a directed verdict for insufficient 
evidence); see also State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 957, 962 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that 
trial court did not commit plain error when it permitted the State to reopen after the court 
had orally dismissed a charge for insufficient evidence); State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600, 
601 (Utah 1951) (noting in dicta that "[t]he State's attorney might properly and with little 
difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence"). 
The decision to allow the prosecution to reopen its case after resting is committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Daday v. R. D. Logging Co., Inc., 2003 UT 
App 125U (civil case); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 740-41 (6th Cir. 
1985) (criminal case). A trial court abuses its discretion only "if the trial court's actions 
are inherently unfair or if. . . no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the 
trial court." Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
"Ordinarily, the trial court is vested with wide discretion to permit the reopening 
of either party's case." United States v. Hinderman, 625 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Matters relevant to the exercise of that discretion may include, but are not limited to, the 
prosecution's "explanation for fail[ing] to present the evidence in its case-in-chief," "the 
timeliness of the motion, the character of the testimony, and the effect of granting the 
motion." Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 741. "The most important consideration is whether 
the opposing party is prejudiced by reopening." Id. But "prejudice means more than the 
denial of an unearned windfall; it requires unfairness." United States v. Keyes, 214 Fed. 
Appx. 145, 153 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (addressing trial court's decision to permit 
prosecution to reopen soon after the prosecution had rested, before the defense had 
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presented any evidence, and before the case had been submitted to the jury) (attached in 
Addendum B). 
Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Its decision to allow the 
State to reopen was not inherently unfair, nor was it a decision that no reasonable person 
would have taken. Moreover, many factors supported the decision. First, a reasonable 
explanation existed for the State's failing to present the evidence in its case in chief. As 
explained above, evidence of venue is unnecessary. Further, even assuming it was 
necessary, the prosecution's failure to elicit testimony that Saddler Drive was in West 
Jordan City and that West Jordan City was in Salt Lake County was, as the trial court 
found, inadvertent. See Rl29:72. "Reopening is often permitted to supply some 
technical requirement such as the location of a crime—needed to establish venue—or to 
supply some detail overlooked by inadvertence." Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 740; see 
Keyes, 214 Fed. Appx. at 153 (proper to permit reopening to supply testimony 
inadvertently omitted). 
Finally, defendant suffered no prejudice. The trial court permitted the State to 
reopen immediately after it had rested and the omission was noted. Defendant had 
presented no testimony at this point. Thus, "[t]he belated receipt of [the] testimony [did] 
not imbue the evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or 
preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional 
testimony offered." Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 741. "Where, as in this case, reopening is 
permitted after the [prosecution] has rested its case in chief, but before the defendant has 
16 
presented any evidence, it is unlikely that prejudice sufficient to establish an abuse of 
discretion can be established." Id. 
Defendant claims that the State's failure to present evidence of venue was 
intentional, not inadvertent. He claims that "the record shows that the State's failure to 
present direct evidence of venue was the result of a conscious decision, not [an] 
oversight." Appellant's Br. at 9. Defendant asserts that the trial court clearly erred when 
it found that the State's failure to elicit evidence that the offense occurred in Salt Lake 
County was inadvertent. See id. at 10. Defendant bases this claim on the fact that "[t]he 
State did not ask to reopen its case to present additional evidence regarding venue" and 
that the "prosecutor list[ed] its evidence related to venue and ask[ed] the trial court to 
take judicial notice that the Saddler Drive address was in Salt Lake County based on the 
evidence." Id. at 10. Defendant claims that "[t]he logical conclusion from this 
evidence . . . is that the State consciously decided to rely on the circumstantial evidence 
presented by Officer Eatchell, rather than eliciting direct evidence of venue." Id. 
Thus, defendant claims that because the State argued that its evidence was 
sufficient to establish venue and/or that the trial court could cure any insufficiency by 
taking judicial notice, the State intentionally left out evidence that the location of the 
address was in Salt Lake County. What defendant's evidence shows is that the 
prosecutor, making the best arguments he could, attempted to convince the trial court to 
deny the motion to dismiss. It fails to show that before resting the prosecutor 
intentionally chose not to present evidence that the offense occurred in Salt Lake County. 
17 
Defendant also claims that he suffered prejudice because he was convicted: 
"[A]bsent the additional evidence presented after the court improperly allowed the State 
to reopen its case, there was insufficient evidence to establish venue by a preponderance 
of the evidence." Appellant's Br. at 11. Defendant does not demonstrate or even claim 
that the trial court's decision to allow the State to reopen prejudiced his ability to present 
his defense. See id. at 6-13. He claims only the loss of an unearned windfall. "[T]he 
denial of an unearned windfall" does not constitute prejudice. Keyes, 214 Fed. Appx. at 
153. Thus, even assuming that the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen, any 
error was not prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's claim fails for multiple reasons. Venue is not an element of the 
offense and need not be proved to the jury. Defendant did not object to venue before trial 
and thus waived any objection to venue. In any case, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it permitted the State to reopen its case in chief to present evidence that 
the offense occurred in Salt Lake County. 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.. 
Respectfully submitted this § day of 4S==F**&£ ejffl>hu , 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
76-1-202, Venue of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where the offense is alleged to have been 
nmitted. In determining the proper place of trial, the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is consummated within this state, the 
ender shall be tried in the county where the offense is consummated. 
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results that constitute elements, whether the conduct 
result constituting elements is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense may 
held in any of the counties concerned. 
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is located in one county and his victim is 
ated in another county at the time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county. 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in another county, the offender may be 
d^ in either county. 
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any county in which any act that is an element 
the offense, including the agreement in conspiracy, is committed. 
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another in the planning or 
mmission of an offense in another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county. 
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be readily determined in which county or 
rtrict the offense occurred, the following provisions shall be applicable: 
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft passing within this 
ite, the offender may be tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft 
s passed. 
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering on or within this state, the offender may 
tried in any county adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall include but not be 
mited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, whether natural or man-made. 
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in which he exerts control over the property 
fected. 
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or more counties, trial of the offense may be 
Id in any of such counties. 
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which the defendant resides, or, if he has no 
ted residence, in the county in which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited. 
(h) A person who commits an offense based on Chapter 6, Part 11, Identity Fraud Act, may be tried in the 
>unty: 
(i) where the victim's personal identifying information was obtained; 
(ii) where the defendant used or attempted to use the personally identifying information; 
(iii) where the victim of the identity fraud resides or is found; or 
(iv) if multiple offenses of identity fraud occur in multiple jurisdictions, in any county where the victim's 
entity was used or obtained, or where the victim resides or is found. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before trial. 
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76-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element of the offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense 
irged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be 
pitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the 
finition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
sponderance of the evidence. 
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>wnload Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_01025.ZIP 1,952 Bytes 
ctions in this Chapter [Chapters in this Title|All TitleslLegislative Home Page 
t revised: Thursday, July 19, 2007 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
Westiaw. 
214Fed.Appx. 145 Page 1 
214 Fed.Appx. 145, 2007 WL 108295 (C.A.3 (Pa.)) 
(Cite as: 214 Fed.Appx. 145) 
H 
U.S. v. Keyes 
C.A.3 (Pa.),2007. 
This case was not selected for publication in the 
Federal Reporter.Not for Publication in West's 
Federal Reporter See Fed. Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of 
judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. 
See also Third Circuit LAR, App. I, IOP 5.7. (Find 
CTA3 App. I, IOP 5.7) 
United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America 
v. 
Andre KEYES, Appellant in No. 05-1684, 
Fernando Pena, Appellant in No. 05-1859, 
Calvin Goodrich, Appellant in No. 05-1920, 
andAngel Castillo-Bienvenido, Jr., Appellant in No. 
05-1938. 
Nos. 05-1684, 05-1859, 05-1920, & 05-1938. 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 
10,2006. 
Filed Jan, 17,2007. 
Background: Defendants were convicted in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, John R. Padova, J., of conspiracy 
to sell crack cocaine. Defendants appealed. 
Holdings: In a consolidated appeal, the Court of 
Appeals, Rodriguez, District Judge, sitting by 
designation, held that: 
(1) evidence was sufficient to support finding that 
defendants were involved in a single conspiracy to 
sell drugs; 
(2) allowing the government to reopen its case to 
enter lab report into evidence indicating that seized 
drugs were crack was not prejudicial; 
(3) sentence of 260 months incarceration was 
reasonable; 
(4) testimony of government's expert witness, an 
intelligence analyst, regarding cell phone calls 
among the alleged co-conspirators was not 
inadmissible hearsay; and 
(5) even if testimony of government's expert witness 
was improperly admitted, the error was harmless. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Conspiracy 91 €=>47(12) 
91 Conspiracy 
9III Criminal Responsibility 
9111(B) Prosecution 
9 lk44 Evidence 
91k47 Weight and Sufficiency 
91k47(3) Particular Conspiracies 
91k47(12) k. Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence was sufficient to support finding that 
defendants were involved in a single conspiracy to 
sell drugs, rather than multiple conspiracies, as 
required to sustain defendants' convictions for 
conspiring to sell cocaine; the evidence showed that 
the essential feature of the conspiracy was that its 
members cooperatively maintained control of the 
drug trafficking in a specific area and dictated who 
was permitted to sell in that area. Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 
401(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846. 
[2] Criminal Law 110 €=^686(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
IIOXX(C) Reception of Evidence 
110k685 Reopening Case for Further 
Evidence 
110k686 In General 
110k686(2) k. After Party Offering 
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Evidence Has Rested. Most Cited Cases 
In criminal proceedings for conspiring to sell crack 
cocaine, allowing the government to reopen its case 
to enter lab report into evidence indicating that 
seized drugs were crack, was not prejudicial to 
defendant; the motion to reopen was made in a 
timely fashion, the defense had not yet presented 
any evidence, and the case had not been submitted 
to the jury. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970, §§ 401(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 
406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846. 
[3] Conspiracy 91 €^>51 
91 Conspiracy 
9III Criminal Responsibility 
9111(C) Sentence and Punishment 
91k51 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Sentence of 260 months incarceration for 
conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base 
of 50 grams, based on court's finding, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that defendant, was 
responsible for the distribution of 1.5 kilograms of 
crack cocaine, was a leader/supervisor of the 
organization, and had possessed a firearm in 
connection with the offense was reasonable; 
sentence was within the range allowed by statute, 
which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 
10 years imprisonment and a maximum term of life 
imprisonment, and was below sentencing guidelines 
range of 360 months to life. Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 
401(b)(1)(A), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 
846. 
[4] Criminal Law 110 €==>476.6 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XVII(R) Opinion Evidence 
110k468 Subjects of Expert Testimony 
110k476.6 k. Miscellaneous Matters. 
Most Cited Cases 
In drug conspiracy prosecution, testimony of 
government's expert witness, an intelligence analyst, 
regarding cell phone calls among the alleged 
co-conspirators was admissible; such evidence was 
already in the record and expert's testimony could 
be viewed as summary testimony of evidence 
properly received. Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 401(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 
846. 
[5] Criminal Law 110 €==>1169.9 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence 
HOkl 169.9 k. Opinion Evidence. Most 
Cited Cases 
In drug conspiracy prosecution, even if testimony of 
government's expert witness, an intelligence analyst, 
regarding cell phone calls among the alleged 
co-conspirators was improperly admitted, the error 
was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of 
defendants' guilt; the record was replete with 
testimony implicating the defendants in the 
conspiracy. Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 401(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 
846. 
[6] Criminal Law 110 €=>H73.2(9) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 173 Failure or Refusal to Give 
Instructions 
HOkl 173.2 Instructions on Particular 
Points 
HOkl 173.2(9) k. Purpose and 
Effect of Evidence; Excluding Evidence from 
Consideration. Most Cited Cases 
District court's failure to give a limiting instruction 
about testimony concerning defendant's use of and 
struggle with a gun was harmless error in drug 
conspiracy prosecution; testimony was properly 
admitted that defendant and a co-defendant 
pistol-whipped an individual for selling drugs 
without permission in the vicinity of the 
conspiracy's drug locations. Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 
401(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846; Fed.Rules EvidRuIe 
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
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*147 On Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
(Nos.03-cr-487-03, -09, -11, -01), The Honorable 
John R. Padova, District Judge. 
Francis C. Barbieri, Jr., Office of United States 
Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for United States of 
America. 
Marc S. Fisher, Worth, Magee & Fisher, Allentown, 
PA, for Andre Keyes. 
Paul M. George, McKinney & George, 
Philadelphia, PA, for Fernando Pena. 
Mark S. Refowich, Easton, PA, for Calvin Goodrich. 
David L. McColgin, Elaine Demasse, Defender 
Association of Philadelphia Federal Court Division, 
Philadelphia, PA, for Angel Castillo-Bienvenido, Jr. 
Before ALDISERT and ROTH,™* Senior Circuit 
Judges, RODRIGUEZ, FN**District Judge. 
FN* The Honorable Jane R. Roth assumed 
senior status on May 31, 2006. 
FN** The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
, Senior United States District Judge for 
the District of New Jersey, sitting by 
designation. 
RODRIGUEZ, District Judge. 
**1 In consolidated appeals, Appellants, Andre 
Keyes, Fernando Pena, Calvin Goodrich, and Angel 
Castillo-Bienvenido, Jr., appeal their convictions 
and sentences entered in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania after they were found guilty of 
conspiracy to sell crack cocaine in Reading, 
Pennsylvania from January 2002 through October 
2003. 
Keyes based his appeal on the argument that the 
Government did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was part of a single conspiracy to 
distribute drugs; instead, he argues, the evidence 
showed there were distinct and multiple 
conspiracies at work. He also argues that the 
district court improperly allowed the Government to 
reopen its case and introduce a new document never 
shared with defense counsel until after the 
Government failed to introduce evidence sufficient 
to sustain three charges against Keyes. 
Pena has argued that the evidence at trial showed he 
was a competitor, rather than a member of the drug 
dealing conspiracy charged in this case. He also 
asserts that the sentencing court should not have 
permitted the Government to call new witnesses at 
his sentencing in order to enhance his guideline 
calculation with facts that had not been proven to a 
jury; Pena *148 was sentenced to 260 months of 
incarceration. 
Goodrich seeks review of one issue: whether the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting into 
evidence testimony regarding cell phone records, 
the identities of the recipients of cell phone calls, 
and the identities of cell phone number owners. 
Goodrich argues that such evidence was hearsay. 
Similarly, Castillo-Bienvenido argues that the 
district court erred in failing to exclude as hearsay 
the testimony of, and written charts and graphs 
created by, law enforcement officers regarding cell 
phone records because no custodian of the records 
or other qualified witness authenticated the records 
or explained how they were compiled and kept. 
Castillo-Bienvenido also contends that he was 
unfairly prejudiced by the admission of testimony 
that he held a loaded gun to a man's back on a 
public street and wrestled with the man for control 
of the gun, when he was not charged with a firearms 
offense and the incident was not shown to be related 
to the charges against him. 
Because we write solely for the parties, we will only 
mention those facts relevant to our analysis. On 
October 28, 2003, a Grand Jury in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania returned a Superseding 
Indictment against Defendant-Appellants Andre 
Keyes, Fernando Pena, Calvin Goodrich, Angel 
Castillo-Bienvenido, and nine co-defendants. 
Keyes, Pena, Goodrich, and Castillo-Bienvenido 
were charged with conspiracy to distribute in excess 
of fifty grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); Keyes, Goodrich, and 
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Castillo-Bienvenido were charged with possession 
with intent to distribute in excess of five grams of 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 
and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Ten and 
Count Nineteen) and possession with intent to 
distribute in excess of five grams of cocaine base 
within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Eleven 
and Count Twenty). In addition, Keyes was 
charged with possession of a firearm in furtherance 
of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 and employing a 
juvenile to distribute crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 861(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On or about 
February 18, 2004, following a six-day jury trial, 
Keyes, Pena, Goodrich, and Castillo-Bienvenido 
were convicted of all charged counts. 
**2 This Court has jurisdiction to review the final 
judgments of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291; we also have jurisdiction over these appeals 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
Single versus Multiple Conspiracies 
The issue of whether a single conspiracy or multiple 
conspiracies exists is a fact question to be decided 
by a jury. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 
572 (3d Cir.1994). Keyes has argued that the 
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of a 
single conspiracy to distribute drugs. Specifically, 
Keyes contends that many of the alleged drug 
houses run by the "Tenth Street Gang" were 
actually independently operated and kept so under 
threat of violence. To support this contention, 
Keyes points to the testimony of Miguel 
Acevedo-Hernandez, Andrew Anthony Cruz, 
Jessica Almodovar, and Kenneth *149 Willams. In 
addition, Keyes has argued that there were multiple 
conspiracies because "different people were caught 
at different places doing their own different 
operations." 
Similarly, Pena has argued that the evidence failed 
to demonstrate that he was a member of the charged 
conspiracy. Instead, he contends, he was a 
competitor. He has appealed the denial of his 
motion for acquittal, but acknowledges that a 
reviewing court will overturn a jury verdict only 
when the record contains no evidence, regardless of 
how it is weighted, from which a jury could find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 
Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d Cir.1999). 
The standard of review for sufficiency of the 
evidence claims is a deferential standard. United 
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998) 
(citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 
(3d Cir.1996)). This inquiry does not require a 
court to ask itself whether it believes that the 
evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 
Instead, the relevant question is whether after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. 
The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement. 
United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258-59 (3d 
Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 
589, 595 (3d Cir.1983)). The government need 
only prove that the defendant agreed with at least 
one of the persons named in the indictment that they 
or one of them would perform an unlawful act. Id. 
at 259. The essential elements of conspiracy are 1) 
whether there was a common goal among the 
conspirators, 2) whether the agreement 
contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result 
that would not continue without the continuous 
cooperation of the co-conspirators, and 3) the extent 
to which the participants overlap in the various 
dealings. Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259; but see United 
States v. Padilla, 982 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir.1992) ( 
"we note that the Kelly factors are most useful to 
show the existence of a single conspiracy, but that 
the absence of one factor does not necessarily 
defeat an inference of the existence of a single 
conspiracy"). 
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**3 In Kelly, the defendant was convicted of 
conspiracy to import and distribute P2P and to 
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. Id. at 
256-57. The defendant argued on appeal that he 
was unfairly prejudiced by a variance between the 
single conspiracy charged in the indictment and 
evidence at trial, which he claimed proved several 
conspiracies. Id. at 258. This Court affirmed the 
conviction and reasoned that 1) the common goal 
was to make money from selling drugs, 2) the 
success of one group was necessary for the success 
of another group because the nature of the scheme 
required cooperation to provide a steady supply of 
P2P, and 3) the government need not prove that 
each defendant knew all the details, goals, or other 
participants in order to find a single conspiracy. Id. 
Although multiple conspiracies are "separate 
networks operating independently of each other," 
the relatedness of the activities of the 
co-conspirators in support of the overall illegal 
scheme can defeat a claim of multiple conspiracies. 
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 346 (3d 
Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 
641, 648 (3d Cir.1992)). In Perez, the defendant 
was convicted of conspiring to distribute and to 
possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. 
Id. at 326. The defendant contended that the 
conviction should be overturned because there was 
*150 not specific knowledge of an interdependency 
among the various factions. Id. at 347. This Court 
disagreed and affirmed the conviction. We 
reasoned that a party did not have to know all the 
details and goals of all the participants to constitute 
a single conspiracy, the party only had to be aware 
that he or she was a part of a larger drug operation. 
Id 
Further, disputes between participants do not 
necessarily fracture a single conspiracy. Kelly, 892 
F.2d at 260 (citing United States v. DeVarona, 872 
F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir.1989)). In Kelly, the 
common catalyst of the disputes between 
defendants was greed; no party wanted to be left 
out of the operation. Id. Therefore, the court 
reasoned that there were not multiple conspiracies 
operating against one another solely because there 
were disputes between the defendants. Id. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. N< 
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Finally, this Court has recognized, "even an 
occasional supplier (and by implication an 
occasional buyer for redistribution) can be shown to 
be a member of the conspiracy by evidence, direct 
or inferential, of knowledge that she or he was part 
of a larger operation." United States v. Price, 13 
F.3d711,728(3dCir.l994). 
The government's theory in this case was that the 
members of the Tenth Street Gang conspired to 
maintain control over their area with guns, 
threatening and using violence, and wearing 
bullet-proof vests. The evidence showed that 
Miguel Acevedo-Hernandez and Manuel Perez 
controlled the drug trafficking in the area of 10th 
and Franklin Streets and dictated who was 
permitted to sell in that area. 
**4 [1] We find that a trier of fact could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Keyes 
was a part of a single conspiracy because he was a 
seller for the drug network of distributor 
Acevedo-Hernandez. For example, Andrew Cruz 
testified that in approximately November 2002, he 
began delivering crack for Miguel 
Acevedo-Hernandez in the vicinity of 10th and 
Frankin Streets. Keyes App. IV 934-38. He 
further testified that he delivered crack from Miguel 
Acevedo-Hernandez to Keyes at 280 South 9th 
Street on two separate occasions. Keyes App. IV 
936-37. Miguel Acevedo-Hernandez admitted 
supplying Cruz with drugs which Cruz distributed 
to sellers in the area, including Keyes. Keyes App. 
V 1040-42. He also stated that the drug business 
was limited to certain approved dealers and that if 
someone else tried to sell in the neighborhood, " 
they would have problems." Keyes App. V 1053. 
Among the people permitted to sell in the area were 
Keyes, Goodrich, Mustafa Sheriff, and 
Castillo-Bienviedo. Keyes App. V 1055. 
In addition, on two occasions, Reading police 
discovered Keyes wearing a bulletproof vest in 
houses where drug deals occurred. Officer Edwin 
Santiago testified that on February 18, 2003, he 
found Keyes sitting next to a firearm at 280 South 
9th Street, where police discovered crack cocaine. 
Keyes App. I 101-07. Officer Jose Colon 
confirmed Officer Santiago's testimony, and 
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reported that Keyes was wearing a bulletproof vest 
at the time of the search. Keyes App. I 130-31. 
Officer Edward Heim testified that on April 29, 
2003, he and other officers served a search warrant 
at the first floor apartment of 37 South 9th Street. 
Inside the apartment the officers found Keyes, 
Goodrich, Wiifredo Ortiz, Lydia Carrera-Aponte, 
and a juvenile. Keyes App. II 385. The police 
recovered 73 packets of crack cocaine, three 
bulletproof vests, and $340 from the room. Once 
again, Keyes was wearing a bulletproof vest. 
Keyes App. II 390. 
Keyes's and Pefia's relationships with other sellers 
were corroborated by cell phone records. Tiffany 
Stambaugh, an intelligence* 151 analyst with the 
Reading Area Violent Crimes Task Force (" 
RAVCTF"), testified with regard to the telephone 
records of co-defendants Mustafa Sheriff, Calvin 
Goodrich, and Andrew Cruz. These records showed 
that Sheriff placed 856 calls to Keyes during the 
three-month period from February 1, 2003 to April 
30, 2003. Keyes App. V 1170. During the same 
period, Sheriff made 556 calls to Cruz, 234 calls to 
Castillo-Bienvenido, 217 calls to Pena, 190 calls to 
Acevedo-Hernandez, and 165 calls to Goodrich. 
Keyes App. V 1170-71. 
In spite of the argument that multiple conspiracies 
existed because "different people were caught at 
different places," Keyes was found at 280 South 9th 
Street, 37 South 9th Street, and 22 Orange Street 
during Reading police raids. In light of the 
testimony presented, we find that a trier of fact 
could have concluded that the 10th and Franklin 
Street gangs benefitted from exclusively selling 
drugs in the 10th Street area and were therefore 
committed to a single, common objective. A 
reasonable jury could infer that the constant 
communication, in just a three-month period, was 
representative of individuals with a common 
objective. 
**5 Further, a trier of fact could have concluded 
that Keyes and Pena and their codefendants had an 
overlap in participation. Officer Gesh introduced a 
videotape of a surveillance he conducted on March 
31, 2003 at 50th South 10th Street and identified 
Keyes, Goodrich, Castillo-Bienvenido, Sheriff, and 
Kenneth Williams standing together at that location. 
Keyes App. I 184. Kenneth Williams admitted he 
was arrested on April 16, 2003, in possession of 9.6 
grams of crack cocaine and a .45 caliber handgun. 
He testified that drugs could be sold in the South 
10th Street location only if they came from one of 
the defendants. Keyes App. II 331. He identified 
the sellers at this location as Pena, Goodrich, 
Castillo, Ortiz, and himself. Pena J.A. 259. Ortiz 
sold at that location for Pena. Pena J.A. 264. 
Williams sold for Sheriff and Cruz. Pena J.A. 
261-63. He described how the sellers cooperated 
by taking turns making sales or pooling their drugs 
to fill larger orders. Pena J.A. 361. He also 
testified that he observed Keyes, 
Castillo-Bienvenido, Goodrich, and Pena working 
together packaging drugs at 37 South 9th Street. 
Keyes App. II284-87, 320-21. 
Jessica Almodovar, a juvenile, testified that Keyes, 
Goodrich, Sheriff, Pena, and Castillo-Bienvenido 
sold drugs from 22 Orange Street and stated that 
Keyes, Sheriff, and Castillo-Bienvenido had given 
her drugs to sell. Keyes App. Ill 642-47. Jasmine 
Lawson admitted selling drugs in the area of 10th 
and Franklin Streets in the summer of 2002 and 
identified Keyes, Goodrich, Sheriff, Pena, 
Castillo-Bienvenido, and Acevedo-Hernandez as 
individuals involved in the drug trafficking in the 
area during the summer of 2002. Keyes App. IV 
744, 754-61. Lawson also testified to seeing 
Castillo-Bienvenido and Sheriff "pistol-whip" 
another person who was attempting to sell drugs in 
the 10th Street area without permission. Keyes 
App. IV 761-64. Only sellers working for a 
member of the conspiracy were permitted to sell 
drugs at 10th and Franklin Streets. Keyes App. IV 
767. 
Lydia Carrera-Aponte testified that Goodrich, 
Sheriff, and Castillo-Bienvenido sold crack cocaine 
in front of her residence at 37 South 10th Street in 
June 2002. Keyes App. IV 829-32. In March 
2003, she lived at 50 South 10th Street and again 
observed Goodrich, Sheriff, Pena, and 
Castillo-Bienvenido selling crack cocaine in her 
apartment building. Keyes App. IV 834-35. 
Later, while living at 37 South 9th Street, she 
observed Keyes, Goodrich, *152 Sheriff, Ortiz, and 
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Castillo-Bienvenido selling crack cocaine in that 
apartment building. Keyes App. IV 840-42. 
While "hanging out" at 22 Orange Street, 
Carrera-Aponte observed Keyes, Goodrich, Sheriff, 
and Castillo-Bienvenido selling crack cocaine. 
Keyes App. IV 847-49. 
A trier of fact could have concluded that Keyes and 
Pena and the other defendants had an overlap in 
participation in the charged conspiracy. The 
evidence showed that the essential feature of this 
conspiracy was that its members cooperatively 
maintained control of the drug trafficking in the 
area of 10th and Franklin Streets, and dictated who 
was permitted to sell in that area. A reasonable 
jury could have found that Keyes and Pena 
participated in and took advantage of this 
arrangement, and thus joined the conspiracy. 
**6 In so deciding, the jury in this case rejected the 
notion that squabbles among the organization's 
members, subdivided into separate territories, 
rendered them "competitors," taking them outside 
the conspiracy. This Court has stated that: 
If it is shown that an organized gang controls drug 
distribution in the defendant's neighborhood and 
that the gang has divided the neighborhood into 
zones in which only a single dealer may operate, 
then the fact that the defendant consistently sells his 
or her drugs only within certain geographical 
parameters would provide evidence that the 
defendant both knew of the existence of the 
conspiracy and was a participant in it. 
United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 151 (3d 
Cir.2001). Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government, as we must, we find a 
reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Appellants were supplied 
with drugs for distribution by Perez and 
Acevedo-Heraandez and knew of, and intended to 
benefit from, the mutual control of the area. 
Accordingly, the conspiracy convictions will be 
sustained. 
Reopening of Government's Case against Keyes 
Page 7 
Keyes argues that the district court improperly 
allowed the government to reopen its case. At the 
conclusion of the government's case-in-chief, 
defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal as 
to Counts 2, 3, and 4 because the government failed 
to introduce evidence that the drugs seized on 
February 18, 2003 were crack. Keyes contends 
that introducing this evidence prejudiced him 
because without it the district court would have 
sustained his motion for judgment of acquittal as to 
Counts 2, 3, and 4. He further contends that he was 
prejudiced because the lab report entered into 
evidence after reopening was never previously 
shared with the defense counsel. In addition, 
Keyes argues that the government did not provide 
the district court with an explanation for its failure 
to provide the required evidence. 
[2] The government contends that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
prosecution to reopen its case. On the last day of 
the government's case-in-chief, the prosecution 
presented the testimony of several chemists 
employed by the Pennsylvania State Police Bureau 
of Forensic Services who had prepared lab reports 
on the drug evidence entered at trial. Chemist Erin 
Luck prepared two lab reports, but was mistakenly 
only asked about one report during the 
government's case-in-chief. The government 
contends that its explanation of "inadvertent mistake 
" was sufficient. The government further contends 
that Keyes was not prejudiced because defense 
counsel had an opportunity to rebut this additional 
evidence. 
The district court's decision on a motion to reopen 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.* 153 Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 
321, 331, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971). 
When deciding whether to permit reopening, the 
court's focus is on whether the party opposing the 
reopening would be prejudiced if reopening is 
permitted. United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 
220 (3d Cir.2000). A critical factor in evaluating 
prejudice is the timing of the motion to reopen. 
United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 181 (3d 
Cir.2002). In Coward, this Court reasoned that 
**7 If [the motion to reopen] comes at a stage in the 
proceedings where the opposing party will have an 
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opportunity to respond and attempt to rebut the 
evidence introduced after reopening, it is not nearly 
as likely to be prejudicial as when reopening is 
granted after all parties have rested, or even after 
the case has been submitted to the jury. 
Id. at 181. In exercising its discretion, the court 
must also consider the character of the testimony 
and the effect of the granting of the motion. Id. 
The evidence proffered should be relevant, 
admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the 
jury in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. Id. 
Further, "[t]he party moving to reopen should 
provide a reasonable explanation for failure to 
present the evidence [initially]." Kithcart, 218 F.3d 
at 220; see also United States v. Blankenship, 775 
F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir.1985) ("reopening is often 
permitted to supply some technical requirement 
such as the location of a crime-needed to establish 
venue-or to supply some detail overlooked by 
inadvertence"). In Kithcart, we reasoned that in 
order to properly exercise its discretion, the district 
court must evaluate the offered explanation and 
determine if it is both reasonable and adequate to 
explain why the government initially failed to 
introduce evidence that may have been essential to 
meeting its burden of proof. Id. 
Here, the district court had the discretion to rule 
that the reopening would not prejudice Keyes 
because the motion to reopen was made in a timely 
fashion. The Government made its motion to 
reopen soon after resting its case-in-chief, the 
defense had not yet presented any evidence, and the 
case had not been submitted to the jury yet. Keyes 
App. V 1208. Therefore, the timing of the motion 
did not prejudice Keyes because there was an 
opportunity to respond and rebut the evidence 
during the defense case. 
Despite Keyes's argument that permitting the 
Government to reopen its case was prejudicial 
because without the omitted testimony he would 
have been acquitted on three counts of the 
indictment, prejudice means more than the denial of 
an unearned windfall; it requires unfairness. The 
only claim of unfairness is based on the 
prosecution's failure to turn over a copy of the lab 
report on a timely basis, not that the timing of the 
production impaired or prejudiced his defense. 
Keyes App. V 1207-08. Indeed, the defense did 
not ask questions regarding the conclusions reached 
by the chemists' testimony. Keyes App. IV 
1226-27. 
In addition, the prosecution provided a reasonable 
and adequate explanation when it admitted 
inadvertence: 
Yes, Your Honor, the Pennsylvania State Police 
routinely describe cocaine base or powder as just 
cocaine. Sometimes it is necessary in a federal 
case to go back and ask them to do a supplemental 
report that distinguishes between cocaine and 
cocaine base. That was done in this case. I did 
not receive a copy of that revised program until I 
had gone to Reading on Friday of last week. I have 
not provided a copy to counsel, and it was through 
inadvertence.*154 The only difference, though, 
between this document and the one they had before 
is instead of calling it [cocaine, it is called cocaine 
base.] 
**8 Keyes App. V 1207-08. The district court 
accepted this as an adequate explanation of the 
prosecution's failure to introduce the evidence 
during its case-in-chief, stating, "All right. They 
can reopen. It's a minor matter, it won't take that 
long. Everybody makes mistakes. We had a 
mistake on the verdict sheet." Keyes App. V 1208. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when 
it determined that the prosecution could reopen its 
case because the defense was not prejudiced and the 
prosecution's explanation of its failure to introduce 
evidence was reasonable and adequate. 
Pena's Sentence 
Pena has objected to the sentence imposed, arguing 
that the sentencing court erred in considering 
factors not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt-that he assumed a leadership role, his use of a 
weapon, and his prior criminal record. 
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Pena was convicted before but sentenced after the 
Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 
(2005), holding that a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury is violated when his or her 
sentence is increased beyond the statutory 
maximum based on the sentencing judge's findings 
of fact beyond facts established by a plea of guilty, 
a jury verdict proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or 
those admitted by the defendant under a mandatory 
application of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines. As we have explained, in light of that 
holding and the "remedial" opinion which rendered 
the Guidelines "effectively advisory," id. at 245, 
125 S.Ct. 738,udistrict courts may fact-find to 
increase sentences beyond the Guidelines range 
provided they are within the statutory minimum and 
maximum dictated by the United States Code, take 
into account the relevant sentencing factors set out 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and ultimately are ' 
reasonable.' " United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 
237, 240-43 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. 
at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738). Moreover, we have held 
that the ex post facto principles are not violated 
when the defendant has fair warning that the crime 
he committed is punishable up to the statutory 
maximum of the crime. United States v. 
Pennavaria, 445 F.3d 720, 723 (3d Cir.2006). A 
defendant has fair warning that his sentence could 
be enhanced on judge-found facts as long as the 
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. 
Id. at 723-24. Thus, a defendant may be sentenced 
up to the statutory maximum of the crime 
committed without violating the defendant's due 
process rights. Id. 
[3] We have reviewed the record in this case to 
determine whether the district court erred in relying 
upon judge-found facts to enhance Pena's sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum for his crime. Pena 
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine 
base of 50 grams under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Pena J.A. 
1397. The maximum penalty under the statute is 
life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Pen 
a was sentenced to 260 months in prison, below the 
statutory maximum. Pena J.A. 1461. 
**9 At the sentencing hearing held on March 14, 
2005, over Pena's objection, the Government called 
Mustafa Sheriff and Manuel Perez to testify to the 
quantity of crack cocaine Pena distributed during 
the course of the conspiracy, his role in the 
conspiracy, and his possession of a gun. Pena J.A. 
1426-52. Based on this testimony, the district 
court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that he was *155 responsible for the distribution of 
1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, was a 
leader/supervisor of the organization, and had 
possessed a firearm in connection with the offense. 
Pena J.A. 1454-57. Those findings, to which Pena 
has presented no factual rebuttal, made his offense 
level 42 and, with his criminal history of VI, his 
guideline sentencing range was determined to be 
360 months to life. After considering the advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines and all relevant "3553(a) 
factors," including the seriousness of the offense 
and Pena's extensive criminal history, the court 
sentenced Pena to 260 months incarceration and 
five years supervised release. Pena J.A. 1457, 
1459-61. This sentence was within the range 
allowed by statute, which imposed a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a 
maximum term of life imprisonment™ 
FN1. The jury found that the conspiracy 
involved more than 50 grams of cocaine, 
and thus the statutory range was ten years 
to life. See2\ U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 
We find the sentencing judge correctly applied the 
Guidelines in an advisory capacity in Pena's case, 
establishing that the applicable guideline range 
under the Sentencing Guidelines would be 360 
months to life. In sentencing Pena to 260 months 
in prison, the judge explicitly acknowledged that the 
Sentencing Guidelines were advisory. We find the 
sentence imposed to be reasonable, and we 
therefore affirm. 
Cell Phone Records 
[4] Goodrich argues that the testimony of the 
Government's expert witness, an intelligence 
analyst, regarding cell phone calls among the 
alleged co-conspirators should have been excluded 
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as hearsay. Counsel objected to testimony that 
Goodrich possessed a particular cell phone number 
because, when he was arrested, he was not in 
possession of a cell phone. Although the expert 
witness testified as to the names or initials or 
nicknames contained in the internal phone books of 
various cell phones seized, implicating Goodrich, 
the phones themselves were not brought into court, 
nor were the records from the cell phone companies 
brought in as business records. Specifically, the 
expert witness testified that she reached the 
conclusion that a telephone number at issue 
belonged to Goodrich through "various proffer 
statements, and the number was listed under his 
known moniker, CJ, in various cell phones." 
Goodrich Supp.App. 1126. Goodrich argues that 
the witness should not have been allowed to rely 
solely upon information furnished to her by other 
investigators, who relied upon what was found in 
the cell phones seized from others. His objection is 
that this testimony that a particular cell phone 
number belonged to him was hearsay and also 
deprived him of his right to confrontation. 
Goodrich also argues that a chart listing calls 
allegedly made in furtherance of the conspiracy and 
a list of numbers from cell phones seized by the FBI 
in this matter were not properly authenticated 
because the witness did not have personal 
knowledge that Goodrich possessed the phone 
number attributed to him. 
**10 The Government contends that its witness 
attributed a cell phone number to Goodrich based 
upon evidence previously admitted at the trial. For 
example, Kenneth Williams identified Goodrich as " 
CJ," referred to him by that nickname throughout 
his testimony, and identified the telephone number 
assigned to Goodrich. Goodrich Supp.App. 
211-12, 219, 221, 235, 240, 245, 237-39. Five 
other cooperating witnesses also identified 
Goodrich as "CJ." Goodrich Supp.App. 211-12, 
470, 603, 722, 793, 1018. Police Officer Edward 
Heim testified that he examined the cell phones 
*156 seized during the investigation and he 
prepared a report listing the numbers programmed 
into the phones; the report was entered into 
evidence without objection. Goodrich Supp.App. 
1089-90, 1154-55. Finally, FBI Special Agent 
Gregory Banis testified that he subpoenaed 
telephone records for three cell phones and 
provided the records to Government witness Tiffany 
Stambaugh of the National Guard Counter Drug 
Program. Goodrich Supp.App. 1103. 
At trial, Stambaugh explained the analysis she 
performed on the phone records to identify the 
number of times each of the three phones called or 
had been called by phones allegedly belonging to 
other members of the conspiracy; she introduced 
charts she had prepared to illustrate her data. 
Goodrich App. 33-36; Goodrich Supp.App. 
1122-24, 1127-39. 
Castillo-Bienvenido has advanced the same 
argument, and has added that the records received 
by Banis and analyzed by Stambaugh were in the 
form of a computer spreadsheet, rather than on 
paper. Accordingly, Stambaugh's analysis was 
based on a computer search through the records. 
Castillo-Bienvenido objected to the admission of 
testimony and exhibits regarding the phone records 
because no authenticating evidence was presented 
to establish how the wireless carrier compiled and 
maintained the phone records. 
The standard of review for admissibility of evidence 
is abuse of discretion. United States v. Serafini, 
233 F.3d 758, 768 (3d Cir.2000). The district 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
Stambaugh to describe a certain telephone number 
as belonging to Goodrich. She explained that the 
number was attributed to him due to proffer 
statements and the fact that it was listed under his 
known moniker, CJ, in various cell phones, 
including that of Kenneth Williams. Goodrich 
Supp.App. 1126-27. Such evidence was already in 
the record; Stambaugh's testimony can be viewed 
as summary testimony of evidence properly 
received. 
Regarding the argument that no foundation was 
established to admit the phone company data as 
business records, Castillo-Bienvenido contends that 
Stambaugh's testimony failed to establish the 
authenticity and reliability of the data she received. 
The Government points out, however, that there 
was no objection to Stambaugh's testimony 
regarding her analysis of the phone records, which 
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all parties accepted at trial. Because 
Castillo-Bienvenido's attorney never objected to the 
business records foundation of the phone records 
during Stambaugh's testimony, Appellant must 
establish plain error to prevail. See United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 
123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Although a proper 
foundation should have been laid for the phone 
records analyzed by Stambaugh, such an error did 
not affect the substantial rights of 
Castillo-Bienvenido. See Johnson v. United States, 
520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 
718 (1997) (to establish plain error, an appellant 
must show that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings). The evidence provided regarding his 
phone records, that is, the frequency of calls 
between his number and three co-defendants, was of 
minimal significance in light of the other 
overwhelming evidence of Castillo-Bienvenido's 
guilt. 
**11 [5] Therefore, we accept the Government's 
alternative argument that even if Stambaugh's 
testimony was improperly admitted, the error was 
harmless given the overwhelming evidence of 
Goodrich's and Castillo-Bienvenido's guilt. The 
record is replete with testimony implicating the 
Appellants in the conspiracy. Though 
corroborative of the witness testimony regarding the 
co-defendants' association with each other, the 
telephone records did not "make the case"; it was 
obviously the *157 credibility of numerous 
cooperating witnesses offered at trial that convicted 
the Appellants. 
Testimony regarding Castillo-Bienvenido and a 
Firearm 
Finally, Castillo-Bienvenido has argues that he was 
unduly prejudiced by prior bad act testimony from a 
cooperating witness to the effect that he held a 
loaded gun to a man's back on a public street and 
wrestled with the man for control of the gun. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the 
admission of other acts evidence for the purpose of 
showing that an individual has a propensity or 
disposition to act in a particular manner. 
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The Court realizes that "the 
Government has broad latitude to use 'other acts' 
evidence to prove a conspiracy." United States v. 
Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 324 (3d Cir.2002). To be 
admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), "(1) the 
evidence must have a proper purpose under Rule 
404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 402; (3) 
its probative value must outweigh its potential for 
unfair prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) 
the Court must charge the jury to consider the 
evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is 
admitted." United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 
261 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 
L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). 
Castillo-Bienvenido was not charged with a 
firearms offense and the incident was not shown to 
be related to the charges against him. Therefore, 
although represented to be probative of the 
allegations in the conspiracy indictment, the 
testimony should have been excluded, as it only 
served to show a tendency to do bad acts. See 
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.1999). 
Moreover, once the testimony was admitted, the 
district court should have charged the jury to 
consider the evidence only for the limited purposes 
for which it was offered. It did not, although 
during discussion of this issue at trial, the court 
indicated that it would give a cautionary instruction. 
Some errors are so unimportant and insignificant in 
the setting of a particular case "that they may, 
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed 
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the 
conviction." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 
499, 508, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a 
reviewing court must consider the trial record as a 
whole, ignoring errors that are harmless. Id. at 
509, 103 S.Ct. 1974. The Court reasoned that " 
given the myriad of safeguards provided to assure a 
fair trial, and taking into account the reality of the 
human fallibility of the participants, there can be no 
such thing as an error-free, prefect trial, and that the 
Constitution does not guarantee such a trial." Id. at 
508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974 (citing Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 
L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). 
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**12 [6] Considering the trial record as a whole, the 
district court's failure to give a limiting instruction 
concerning the testimony of Castillo-Bienvenido's 
use of and struggle with a gun was harmless error. 
As the Government noted, testimony was properly 
admitted that Castillo-Bienvenido and a 
co-defendant pistol-whipped an individual for 
selling drugs without permission in the vicinity of 
the conspiracy's drug locations. Castillo App. Ill, 
859-60. We cannot say, therefore, that the 
disputed testimony combined with the court's failure 
to give a limiting instruction warrants reversal. 
For the forgoing reasons, the judgments entered by 
the district court is affirmed. 
C.A.3 (Pa.),2007. 
U.S. v. Keyes 
214 Fed.Appx. 145, 2007 WL 108295 (C.A.3 (Pa.)) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
